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INTRODUCTION
Although the importance of framing in shaping public policy is well established (Daviter 2011) , only recently have systematic empirical studies shed light on the determinants of interest groups' frame choices in European Union (EU) policy debates initiated by different 2 Directorates-General (DGs) (Klüver et al. 2015) , the degree of 'frame congruence' between Commission officials and either business or civil society interests (Boräng and Naurin 2015) , and how contextual factors affect the types of frames adopted by different interest groups (Eising et al. 2015) . As expected, the Commission is shown to be sensitive to political support in order to develop proposals that will survive the EU policy process. But instead of asking how interest groups '[put] into question the scope, validity or legitimacy of others' arguments' (ibid: 521), including those of Commission officials (Boräng and Naurin 2015) , we might also ask, contrariwise, how the Commission frames debate to enact its preferred policies?
Our starting point is that the Commission is more than just an agenda-setting institution. As guardian of the Treaty and an administrator of European competition law, the Commission can either manipulate the default condition of decision-making within the Council of Ministers by encouraging relevant stakeholders to reach a more acceptable compromise to the (neo-liberal) policies proposed by Brussels (the so-called 'lesser evil' strategy), or seek to change the preferences of individual member states by challenging the propriety of national regulations or the economic and social practices of particular national actors (the so-called 'divide-and-conquer' strategy) (Schmidt 2000) . A third strategy of 'rhetorical framing' is also identified (e.g. Woll 2006 ), but is rarely grounded in any theoretical framework or detailed empirical analysis. To be sure, the concept of framing as the 'politics of signification' (Snow and Benford 1988: 198) is often used to understand the generation, diffusion and functionality of changes in public policy and the explanation of developments between public and private actors (e.g. Surel 2000: 496) . Indeed, the policy frames for particular industrial sectors (e.g. civil aviation) and particular issues (e.g. gender equality) have been analysed in detail (see Woll 2006; and Verloo 2007 respectively) , but 3 rarely in relation to how rhetorical framing supports autonomous action by the Commission via the lesser evil and/or divide-and-conquer strategies. Moreover, any attention to rhetorical framing more often in the context of 'creating consensus' and 'building unity' among member states (e.g. Woll 2006: 55) rather than a mechanism that, through purposive control over verbal and other forms of interchange, can not only 'mobilize potential adherents and constituents' but also 'demobilize antagonists' (Snow and Benford 1988: 198) . Of the 'three faces of power' (Lukes 2005) , namely the capacity to prevail in explicit contests, the ability to set agendas (i.e. to determine the issues over which there will be any explicit contest at all), and the linguistic premises upon which the legitimacy of accounts will be judged, the latter is the least visible (and hence most unaccountable) form of power. Our aim is to show how this 'third face of power' exercised by the Commission can be made transparent and accountable.
All too often, the linguistic premises of European policy-making remain hidden from public debate and the scrutiny of social scientists (Hay and Smith 2005: 125) , despite the fact that policy frames are typically contested. Consider, for example, the policy frame for European ports, where any talk of a pan-European policy has been vigorously contested since the 1970s (Turnbull 2006: 310-11 anticipating a compromise ('lesser evil') between the relevant stakeholders (e.g. shipping lines, shippers, public port authorities, private terminal operators and organised labour), overt conflict spilled over from the waterfront onto the streets of Brussels and Strasbourg (Turnbull 2006 and 2010) , resulting in the Directive being rejected twice by the European Parliament.
Power relationships in any given policy contest are manifest in cognitive and normative frames that legitimate some groups rather than others (Surel 2000: 499) , with some actors 4 cast(igated) as the 'problem group' (in this instance dockworkers) while others are part of the proposed solution.
Our preferred conceptualisation of a policy frame, elaborated in more detail in the following section, is a collective action frame that involves 'diagnostic framing' (problemidentification), 'prognostic framing' (proposed solutions) and 'motivational framing' (Benford and Snow 2000: 615) . Our particular focus is on rhetorical (motivational) framing as a 'call to arms' or rationale for engaging in collective action. Simply put, frames constitute 'how I see the world' whereas rhetorical framing denotes 'how I want you to see the world', in this instance how the Commission seeks to legitimate its own policies and provide adherents with compelling accounts for engaging in collective action. As Benford and Snow (2000: 620) point out, the issue is often not whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are factual or valid, 'but whether their empirical referents lend themselves to being read as "real" indicators of the diagnostic claims'. In the European ports policy frame, even though a 'factual' (albeit contested) Impact Assessment was initiated by the Commission (Van Hooydonk 2013; and European Commission, 2013a; cf. ETF 2013) in preparation for a new
Regulation to establish a Framework on Market Access to Port Services and Financial
Transparency of Ports (European Commission 2013b), the General Secretary of the European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO) doubted 'whether anyone will have the courage to act upon the conclusions of such an analysis' (Verhoeven, 2011: 164) . Siim Kallas demonstrated the Commission's 'courage to act', pre-empting the Regulation by initiating infringement proceedings against Spain and calling port employers 'to arms' in a series of speeches delivered at politically opportune moments during the latest phase of EU port policy-making.
Employers in the port of Antwerp subsequently heeded this call. Such instrumental action will always 'speak louder than words', but ideas and discourse precede, legitimise and actuate 5 policy change. While 'talk is cheap', it might ultimately cost some actors (e.g. dockworkers) their livelihood.
This latest episode in the long-running debate on European ports policy provides an ideal opportunity to assess 'rhetorical framing' as the foundation for a 'divide-and-conquer' strategy in a highly contentious context. Theoretically, we use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to illustrate how Commissioner Kallas used language to justify and advance panEuropean port reform. The lens of CDA enables us to 'see through' the argumentative or figurative devices, the stylistic elements, and how talk itself is arranged for maximum effect in order to comprehend discourse as a form of intentional, controlled and purposeful action.
Empirically, we focus primarily on three Speeches delivered by Commissioner Kallas to different (port-specific) audiences. In these Speeches, what matters is not just the substantive content of ideas -cognitive arguments about their necessity and normative arguments about their appropriateness -but the interactive processes by which they are conveyed and the institutional context in which they are contested (Schmidt, 2007: 993) . In sum, to understand the process, and outcomes, of any rhetorical framing strategy, what matters is not simply what is said, but where, when, why, by who and to whom.
FRAMING IN ACTION
The European Union (EU) is a liberal project, but with its complex institutional architecture, combined with its cultural heterogeneity, Europe constitutes a forum where various streams of market liberalism discourse are intertwined (Morin and Carta 2014: 119 While ideology is a cultural resource for framing activity, the latter, in contrast to the former, is an empirically observable activity rooted in and constituted by social interaction.
Framing is strategic, discursive and contested (Klüver et al. 2015: 483) and as such 'readily available for first-hand observation, examination, and analysis' (Snow and Benford 2000: 59) .
As our interest is focused on collective action framing, it goes without saying that policy framing is understood to be deliberate, utilitarian and goal oriented. For example, the Commission might seek to bridge the gap between different stakeholders to build support for its policy proposals, or extend the frame to other issues that are of importance to potential adherents (e.g. the customers as well as the providers of particular services). The discursive process includes both articulation (i.e. the connection and alignment of events so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion) and amplification (i.e. the accentuation of particular events, issues and beliefs as being more salient than others) (Benford and Snow 2000: 623) . While amplification will invariably involve the clarification, invigoration, and idealisation of existing values and beliefs, as a 'call to arms' it may also involve embellishment in order to fit facts of political, social and economic relations into 'coherent patterns as a critique of current circumstances and a plan of action for the future' (Windt, 1991: 191 Of course, collective action frames need not be generally believable, but they must be believable to some segment of prospective or actual adherents. Put differently, there must be some 'resonance' (Benford and Snow 2000: 620) . If the Commission's strategy is to 'divideand-conquer', then teaming up with private sector actors with specific interests becomes a potential route to changing the preferences of individual member states. For example, a member state might be genuinely unaware that particular sector-specific arrangements infringe European competition law, which creates an information asymmetry in favour of the 8 Commission. However, the Commission must still 'call adherents to arms', ideally via infringement proceedings that are ultimately brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The Commission is then able to use the binding nature of any legal judgements in favour of market liberalisation for its own ends (Schmidt 2000: 39) . In other words, the Commission must mobilise at least some actors in some member states in favour of its preferred (pan-European) policy frame. Once even a minority of member states have incurred the costs of domestic reform, they are themselves interested in comparable community-wide changes (ibid: 47).
How, then, are the Commission's objectives mobilised and maintained linguistically?
Studying EU political speeches is not new (e.g. Erjavec et al. 2009; and Nordin 2011) and previous work has demonstrated how discourses around globalisation and other 'master frames' have shaped policy developments (e.g. Hay and Smith 2005) . Our starting point is that 'cognitive and normative frames not only construct "mental maps" but also determine practices and behaviours' (Surel 2000: 498) . Ontologically, therefore, we differ from some constructivist accounts (e.g. De Ville and Orbie 2014) that downplay causality. We link discourse to its underlying intentions and objectives and do not allow reality construction to overwhelm the structures that influence collective action frames (Reed 1997: 26) . Put differently, while discourse 'socially constructs', discourse itself is also shaped by people, organisations and circumstances.
Any talk on European policy is always ideational and organisational, a process of legitimisation through ideas and procedure (Wodak and Weiss 2004) . Seasoned speechmakers are typically skilled in the art of framing, making some aspects of reality more salient at the expense of other aspects. Consequently, understanding political speeches demands a forensic 9 analytical method such as critical discourse analysis (CDA) to 'decode' the speechmaker's selective version of reality. Here, we use CDA to shed light on the collective action framing of DG Move, and Commissioner Kallas in particular, during the latest phase of EU ports policy making.
DATA AND METHODS
We begin our explanation of methods with a working definition of terms often used generically: discourse, rhetoric, frame and argument. First, we follow the analytical distinction between 'discourse' and 'rhetoric' proposed by Hay and Rosamond (2002: 151) , and posit that while discourses exist independently of the social actors using them and pertain within available 'discursive repertoires', rhetoric is their 'persuasive deployment'. Frames are an organizing mechanism between discourse and rhetoric, as a unifying concept (Van Dijk 1977) that groups together discourses with some synergy. These frames are then deployed using rhetoric, which forms the overarching argument. Our concern is how Commissioner
Kallas draws various discourses into a frame and then delivers (speaks) them to selected audiences, using a range of rhetorical techniques to amplify and, at times, embellish his advocacy of EU port reform. Hence, we move beyond the 'modest identification of discourses' (Hay and Smith 2005: 150-1) and the observation that rhetoric exists within many speech acts. Instead, our purpose is to demonstrate how rhetorical framing is used deliberately and purposefully. Our approach is to map the 'highly suggestive' discourses by considering the collective action frame and the linguistic and rhetorical strategies employed by Commissioner Kallas and, most importantly, his motivations for doing so.
We focus on three Speeches delivered by Commissioner Kallas during a critical 12- (Turnbull, 2010) .
Extempore elements including body language, voice intonation and facial expressions are clearly important within political speechmaking. Analysing transcriptions therefore misses the visual and aural detail as well as the semiotic nature of the venue (Catalano 2011: 52) .
However, as Van Dijk (1997: 21) points out, the spoken word is 'recorded, corrected, printed and possibly published or otherwise made public', and will thereby 'count as' the intervention or position of the person and/or organisation for whom s/he speaks. Consequently, orating and 11 then publishing a public policy speech is a purposeful and deliberate act of motivational framing.
For sound analytical reasons, CDA has been described as discourse analysis 'with attitude' (Van Dijk 2001: 96) , signalling that an otherwise neutral linguistic discipline has acquired political motivation. In particular, the emancipatory objectives of CDA make it well suited for decoding ideologically loaded texts. The assumptions that inform neo-liberalism ). Thus, we evidence how, in the absence of a robust data that might establish the need for change alongside policy options that might work for the benefit of all stakeholders, the Commissioner seeks to manipulate his audience through: (i) repetition, (ii) (de)coupling, and (iii) rhetorical contrast. We analyse repetition within and across speeches to demonstrate how Commissioner Kallas seeks to press home the neo-liberal agenda and then couple (decouple) this with positive (negative) outcomes. Rhetorical contrast is then deployed to create a sense of urgency -the idea that the industry stands at a critical juncture -and to build solidarity among actual and potential supporters of port reform.
13
Repetition across the three Speeches is perhaps the most immediate and most striking feature of the Commissioner's talk. However, in the analysis that follows, instead of repeating examples from every Speech we present only one or two examples and mark the quote with a single asterisk (*) if there is a similar example in the other Speeches and a double asterisk (**) where a phrase is repeated almost verbatim (the online appendix documents many more examples). Our own aversion to repetition in no way detracts from the conclusion that rhetorical framing can be deployed to 'kick start' a divide-and-conquer strategy with much wider ramifications, most notably for dockworkers, especially when the Commission has the legitimacy, and courage, to 'kick first'.
TALKING UP A STORM

Let's Be Clear About Repetition
Our starting point (the outer layer of Figure 1 By featuring transparency so strongly and so often, Commissioner Kallas implicitly but continually reminds his audiences that current port regimes are purposefully opaque and overly complex. Unstated, and yet clear nonetheless, is the inference that national (industryspecific) regulations are undesirable and should be replaced with a common standard; to do this national regimes must first be delegitimised as an inefficient bricolage. It is these national regimes that constitute the 'last line of defence' for European dockworkers (Turnbull 2006 and 2010) .
Repetition is an essential rhetorical element of successful political speechmaking (Catalano 2011: 57) , which simplifies the processing of messages by combining clarity and focus with emphasis and accentuation (Tannen 2007 
You Can't Have One Without the Other
The linguistic technique of (de)coupling is an attempt to legitimise an organisation's actions and aspirations by (dis)associating with (un)acceptable values (Meyer and Rowan 1977) .
Within rhetorical theory, this might be described as 'logos', where there is an 'appeal to reason' to accept what might be considered perfectly reasonable, common-sense value systems. For example, 'transparency' is not simply repeated to reinforce, but is joined to other considerations that build a more legitimate and widely acceptable message. Thus, in the master frame of neo-liberalism, the outer layer of Figure 1 , transparency is typically presented as a precondition for an 'open market' and a 'level playing field' for competition. In the ports policy frame, transparency is coupled with other positive outcomes such as fairness, longterm investment, the simplification of rules, increased productivity and financial limpidity.
All are intuitively desirable. Ipso facto, transparency must also be desirable. When coupled together, they build a rhetorical case for port reform in the absence of 'hard evidence'. The following examples suggest that ports must change or suffer the damaging consequences:
19 transparency plus … Speech 1: "the idea is not to create more rules. It is to standardise the different conditions that exist today for concessions in many Member States and to make them more transparent"* Speech 2: "it is about having greater transparency and fewer restrictions, to remove barriers for new entrants wanting to tender fairly and openly"** Speech 3: "public funding should not be used to distort port charges for using infrastructure, which should be set in a transparent and non-discriminatory way"** Transparency and clarity are coupled with reasonable, positive and necessary outcomes; most notably, it is suggested to be the antidote to discrimination. Because of the lexical choices of clarity/transparency, the constructed discourse is an advocacy of 'standardisation', 'open practice' and 'barrier reduction' to enable free-market principles and practices within European ports. Indeed, lexical selections are key in matters of representation (Machin and Mayr 2012) and the efficacy of specific choices can be increased when combined -or coupled -with agreeable outcomes. Commissioner Kallas does this often and effectively in his three Speeches, not only to reinforce the claimed benefits of reform but also to more clearly establish who is 'for' and who is 'against'.
If Not This, Then What?
Rhetorical contrasts are extensively used within political speechmaking. In the new European ports policy frame, the repetition of 'transparency', coupled with seemingly desirous outcomes and contrasted with negative outcomes if reform is not accepted, is used to build a 20 compelling and rational case, at least for potential and current adherents. Commissioner (e.g. 'that', 'this', 'them', and 'us') helps to position groups within power structures (Catalano 2011) . Commissioner Kallas uses 'we' and 'them' to further the constructed notion of 'us' versus the collective 'other' (cf. Machin and Mayr 2012: 84) . 'We' develops group membership (Krzyżanowski 2005: 150) and notions of shared interest as Commissioner Kallas also capitalises on the ambiguous nature of 'we'. Consequently, it is often unclear to whom 'we' refers. Irrespective of its nebulous status, it is likely that Commissioner Kallas uses 'we' to indicate communality and collaboration and to provide a 'bridge' between different interest groups. It is hard to resist the conclusion that 'we' is used 22 to promote a 'spurious solidarity' (Fairclough 1989: 12) , as the following examples serve to illustrate:
Speech 1: "we need to improve access to ports as well as raise their efficiency"
Speech 2: "we also need to examine the issue of financial transparency"
In these examples, 'we' is ambiguous and lacks definition. One alternative is that it could refer to the (all inclusive) 'royal we', such that 'we' (and 'us') develop apparent commonality between stakeholders. Even those disadvantaged by deregulation are thereby swept along, or aside, as part of a forward movement for the proclaimed common good. In contrast, in the following examples, Commissioner Kallas differentiates between 'we' and 'the port transport sector'. When used in this more specific way, and in conjunction with 'you', the pronoun 'we' seemingly becomes the legislature requesting the co-operation of other social actors making up the audience of either the 'live' or transcribed Speech, recognising that some will be 'for' and some will be 'against': Speech 1: "So how do we go forward? Firstly, we naturally want to hear your views and valuable input" Speech 2: "we are all here today in our respective roles ... we all have our interests and they will not always converge" both. Thus, despite claims that "our intention is to be light on regulation" and "we don't want to impose unnecessary red tape" (Speech 3), CDA shows that 'we' (the legislature) is strongly advocating free-market principles for European ports, with the process of consultation ("we" ask for "your" input) perhaps masking this effect and suggesting some illusion of choice.
Since repeated use of the inclusive 'we' constructs a community with common goals and values, by the time Commissioner Kallas uses 'we' more narrowly, the communal 'we' has long been established. 'We' are now ready for action, despite the opposition of dockworkers.
But will the Commission and its supporters ultimately conquer the opposition?
CONCLUSION
In setting the agenda for EU port reform - Although it is widely accepted that discourses play a powerful causal role in determining the ideational structures and norms of political debate within the EU (Hay and Rosamond 2002) as well as the trajectory of policy change (Hay and Smith 2005) , such that discourses are now treated as objects of enquiry in their own right, much of this analysis has focused on the 'master frames' of liberalisation and globalisation (the outer layer of Figure 1) and has less often considered how rhetorical framing might support policy framing and collective action by European actors at the sectoral level. This is especially important when the Commission is seeking to 'divide-and-conquer' because any collective action framing must function both as a mechanism to legitimate action on its own part and to persuade actual or potential adherents to engage in (collective) action in support of the Commission's preferred (pan-European) policy. Rhetorical framing will therefore pre-empt and help to sustain collective action by the Commission and adherents of Commission policies. By legitimating some groups rather than others, the strategy of rhetorical framing is not only a 'call to arms' but a 'delineation of the battle lines' that determine the issues over which there will be any explicit contest. By considering text in its political context, CDA is able to decode the messages sent by the Commission or indeed any political actor to its intended audience. If the text is made transparent, and the speaker is held to account, we can reveal how discursive repertoires become rhetorical strategies and the role these strategies play in policy framing, collective action and subsequent policy decisions that benefit some and disadvantage others. 
